Still, there is another earlier election that will have far-reaching consequences for all Americans as well. On Sunday, June 2, 2024, Mexico will go to the polls to elect a new president. According to the polls, former Mexico City mayor Claudia Sheinbaum is leading her closest rival, Xóchitl Gálvez, by double digits.

Sheinbaum is known as a leftist nationalist who is committed to continuing the policy platform of current president Andres Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). Gálvez has promised to reject those nationalistic attitudes and policies and adopt a more business-friendly and collaborative relationship with the United States.

Here are seven numerical reasons why the U.S. Congress should pay attention to the Mexican election:

249,735: In December of 2023, almost a quarter of a million migrants were either apprehended or expelled at the United States’ Southwest border. According to the Pew Research Center, that “was the highest monthly total on record, easily eclipsing the previous peak of about 224,000 encounters in May 2022.” The outgoing president, López Obrador, initially worked closely with the U.S. government on this shared goal of reducing illegal immigration, but in recent years, he has scaled back cooperation. The next Mexican president will have to decide whether to renew and re-energize bilateral U.S. cooperation, especially within the realm of controlling the flow of migrants coming through Mexico en route to the southern U.S. border.

280,000 is the number of foreign nationals deported from Mexico in March 2024. Due to pressure from the U.S. government, President López Obrador has once again begun helping stem the flow of migrants across its territory after drastically reducing those efforts in 2023. Will the next president allocate the funding needed to stop migrants within Mexican territory?

107,543 drug overdoses occurred in the United States in 2023, according to the CDC. Mexico is a critically important partner in fighting the drug trade, but in recent years, the Mexican government has taken a lighter hand when it comes to tackling drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs). President López Obrador has adopted a “hugs, not bullets” strategy in dealing with organized crime and has repeatedly denied Mexican involvement in manufacturing fentanyl, the most lethal drug currently crossing the border. If the next president continues this policy of inaction, the synthetic drug problem in the United States will only worsen, with catastrophic consequences for public health.

US $63.3 billion is the amount of remittances sent to Mexico in 2023, almost all of which came from the United States. This number has grown from $36 billion before the pandemic. In large part, this flow of dollars to the Mexican economy has helped sustain domestic demand and has compensated for a lack of growth. If the next president can stimulate the Mexican economy, these remittances will become much less important.

US $44.2 billion is the value of refined petroleum products exported by the United States to Mexico in 2022. Mexico has become the United States’ largest export market for gasoline and other refined products, and this sum has grown four-fold in the past decade. AMLO has overseen a rapid deterioration in Mexico’s oil sector but has committed himself to a very ambitious and expensive goal of producing more refined products at home. If successful, this “energy sovereignty” policy will directly impact U.S. exports. Of the two leading candidates, Sheinbaum is committed to continuing AMLO’s approach. Galvez supports a free-market model of modernization and liberalization of the sector.

5.7 billion is the volume in cubic feet of natural gas exported to Mexico from the United States every day. Mexico’s industrialization and growing need for power generation will see this number grow even further in the years ahead if the next president pursues the right economic policies. However, a number of economic nationalist voices in the Mexican government have warned of potential over-dependence on U.S.-provided gas, which they believe could pose a threat to Mexico’s sovereignty — a fear that could affect the continued strength and viability of the energy trade.

1: Mexico is the largest trading partner for the United States. In 2023, for the first time, Mexico traded more goods with the United States than any other country, surpassing China and Canada — who, for years, had held the top spot. Total trade between the two countries amounted to $799 billion in 2023. That is $2.2 billion a day, over $91 million an hour, and over $1.5 million a minute. The deepening of ties between the United States and Mexican economies has reached the point where they are an essential element in maintaining U.S. competitiveness. Perhaps this reason, above all the others, is the most compelling reason to pay attention to Mexico’s election.

The choice facing the Mexican people in June is one of continuity or change. Continuity means that cooperation between the United States and Mexico on issues of security, migration, and narco-trafficking will remain difficult and limited. This election is critical for the well-being of citizens and the economies on both sides of the border. Good governance in Mexico, paired with solid cooperation between the new Mexican government and the United States, will be essential in promoting the welfare of both nations.

This article was originally published by The Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center.

Duncan Wood, PhD, Vice President for Strategy & New Initiatives and Senior Advisor to the Mexico Institute, focuses his research and publications on supply chain policy, critical minerals, Mexican politics and US-Mexican ties.  He regularly gives testimony to Congress and other national legislatures, and has published 12 books and is a widely quoted source in national and international media.

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Claudia Sheinbaum, the leading candidate ahead of the June 2 elections, would undoubtedly face ever more brazen — and politically motivated — criminal actors if she becomes Mexico’s next president.

Since the election of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2018, organized crime has ramped up efforts to strong-arm the state. Favored tactics include road blockades, banners threatening officials and the dumping of human remains outside government buildings. 

Political assassinations are the most direct line of attack. The current campaign season is shaping up to be the deadliest on record, according to data from the Mexican think tank  Laboratorio Electoral. Since the official start of the electoral season on September 7th, 2023 until the publication of this piece, 30 political aspirants and candidates have been slain in Mexico. Hundreds have withdrawn from the race (358 candidates in Zacatecas and another 190 candidates in Michoacán) — while an unknown quantity chose not to risk running at all. 

Organized crime groups were likely behind most of these killings. As politicians across the country hit the campaign trail, gangs launched their own violent bids for increased protection and influence.  

Criminals are also desperate to collaborate with politicians. Gangs have little chance of survival unless they can secure under-the-table deals with mayors and turf pacts with police. Illegal campaign financing is an ongoing concern. In troubled regions, criminal groups even field their own candidates. 

Alongside the growing threat of “narco politics,” the new Mexican president will also have to shield the economy from the worst impacts of criminality. In recent years, gangs have diversified beyond drug trafficking. Illicit activities such as cargo theft and counterfeiting are a mounting problem for the private sector. 

Extortion is an even greater menace to businesses. Criminal groups historically demanded payments from small-scale vendors, such as market workers or chicken shop owners. Today, they routinely fix prices by forcing family-owned businesses to buy products at inflated costs from suppliers they have compromised; for instance, fruit or poultry farms. Business leaders say gangs in at least 10 Mexican states are even banning the sale of products from companies outside their extortion rackets. 

Nor is this crisis contained. Security challenges in Mexico have consequences that cross borders. Gangs threaten regional supply chains and forcibly displace communities, fueling undocumented migration. Criminal fragmentation also risks creating new entrants into the fentanyl market. That shift could deepen the opioid overdose crisis in the United States, as inexperienced cooks inaccurately measure substances. 

Sheinbaum, the candidate for the ruling National Regeneration Movement (Morena) party, is keen to downplay this situation. The heavy favorite for the presidency, Sheinbaum has already backed the non-confrontational approach of President López Obrador. She also plans to double down on the militarization of public security. As well as spending heavily on the army, Sheinbaum hopes to complete the transfer of the National Guard, Mexico’s main federal law enforcement agency,  from civilian to military control, which has been halted by the Supreme Court. But neither the army nor the National Guard have proven effective in tackling criminal networks. Both forces have also been accused of  widespread human rights abuses. 

Despite these failings, the leading candidate has outlined some policies that could prove effective. Sheinbaum hopes to strengthen Mexico’s intelligence agency and create a national crime database. She also wants to classify extortion as a serious crime.  

But the next administration will face security challenges of an unprecedented scale. Turning a blind eye to the crisis is unlikely to remain an option. The widespread use of shock and awe tactics by Mexican mafias, criminal infiltration into politics and the economic impact of extortion will demand a response from the new president. That emergency will heighten calls to strengthen investigative capacities and counter the outrageous impunity that persists across Mexico. 

Greater cooperation with U.S. security agencies is also essential. Both countries need to scrutinize suspicious financial activity and crack down on weapons trafficking. To be truly effective, Mexico’s next president must work from an understanding that insecurity in Mexico is part of a shared crisis with the United States. 

Stephen Woodman is the associate director of Advanced Intelligence Solutions (AIS), a consultancy that works with government agencies and corporations to identify and mitigate security risks across Latin America. Based in Guadalajara, Mexico, he primarily investigates organized crime. Woodman was formerly a journalist, covering security and human rights in Mexico. His investigative features have been published by the Financial Times, BBC News and Reuters, among other outlets.

This article was originally published by the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

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Reducing the state’s use of force has not reduced criminal violence either because most of that violence is related to confrontations among criminal organizations in which the state is merely a spectator.

The above paragraphs are obviously a massive simplification but provide a useful guide on how not to think about the solutions to Mexico’s insecurity problems. The security strategy of the new administration, whether headed by Claudia Sheinbaum or Xóchitl Gálvez, should learn from past failures and ask the right questions when designing policy interventions.

Increasing the state’s coercive power is a necessary but not sufficient condition to effectively reduce crime and violence. We need to think beyond what the different administrations have already implemented. 

Here are two key questions we should be asking ourselves when designing the new administration’s security policy.

First, how can the current public insecurity problem be turned into something more manageable? It is clear that state organizations are overwhelmed. When a problem is as big and complex as public insecurity in Mexico, a useful approach is to first consider how to make the problem smaller before thinking about potential solutions.

An obvious option to simplify the fight is to legalize drugs in order to minimize black markets and the conflict surrounding them. This will not solve the problem by itself but will free a lot of budgetary and human resources to fight “easier” crimes and will reduce the incentives for corruption.

Obviously, legalization is not trivial, but we should start thinking about and working on it.

Second, how can we reduce the lethality of criminal organizations’ confrontations? Criminal organizations and conflicts among them exist in most countries, but not all confrontations are equally lethal. The variance is strongly related to the sort of weapons that these organizations utilize to confront each other. In this respect, illegal arms trafficking from the United States is a key problem to tackle. The current administration has taken an important step by explicitly including the topic in the agenda and acting upon it. It should now be a priority. 

Overall, the very least we should ask is that the new policies and actions be based on evidence. There is already significant knowledge on the matter, which should be used.

Vidal Romero is a professor in the Political Science Department at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Codirector of ITAM’s Center for the Study of Security, Intelligence and Governance (CESIG), and a faculty affiliate at ITAM’s Center on Energy and Natural Resources. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.

This article was originally published by the Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

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The reform bill aligns with AMLO’s increased public spending and extension of social programs but carries serious long-term implications. The president’s most well-known, and perhaps most efficacious, policy approach has been that of increasing public spending to strengthen the social safety net for Mexico’s most vulnerable populations — groups which have historically been underrepresented and overlooked in the Mexican political sphere.

From Jóvenes Construyendo El Futuro (Youth Building the Future) to a standard universal pension, AMLO and his government have raised the stakes in support of these groups, tripling welfare spending from US $8 billion at the start of the AMLO administration to $24 billion in 2024.

AMLO has doubled down further, promising a 25% increase in social spending for 2024, totaling US $30 billion during the election year. A coincidence? Probably not. 

The support from the highest levels of Mexico’s government for these historically marginalized groups has reaped significant benefits for AMLO himself and for his party’s electoral success. Though Morena became an official political party only in 2014, it won Mexico’s highest elected office just four years later with AMLO’s presidential victory in 2018.

Today, 22 state governments out of Mexico’s 32 states are ruled by Morena. It’s hard to imagine Morena’s skyrocketing success without AMLO’s strategic use of social programs to get out the vote, especially among these underrepresented groups. 

AMLO’s first mention of the pension reform occurred in 2020, but it was not formally announced until February 2024, alongside 20 additional reforms varying in terms of scope and significance. The topic of pension reform came to the forefront last week as the Chamber of Deputies’ Committee on Social Security voted on the proposal. 

Put simply, the proposed reform seeks to amend Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution so that workers aged 65 and over who have contributed to the current retirement pension system (which went into effect in 1997) can receive a pension upon retiring that is equal to the employee’s most recent monthly salary but no higher than the average monthly salary of a Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) worker (around 16,777 Mexican pesos or US $983). 

These pensions are for workers in the formal sector, meaning that retired workers must have some form of social security coverage — either from IMSS or from the Social Services and Security for State Employees Institute (ISSTE).

It’s important to note that only workers in the formal economy are eligible to receive pension funds, thus excluding a significant swath of Mexico’s population. According to data published in January, 53.6% of the economically active population nationwide is employed in the informal sector. However, in states in south and southeast Mexico, the rates of informal employment are substantially higher than the national average, such as in Oaxaca (73.7%), Guerrero (73.2%) and Tlaxcala (69.8%). 

Mexico’s retirement savings system has undergone a significant shift in the past 30 years, in part due to the reform put forth in 1997 during Ernesto Zedillo’s term as president and into the subsequent presidential term of Felipe Calderón.

According to Interior Minister Luisa María Alcalde, prior to 1997, retirees received a monthly pension equal to their average salary for the previous five years before retiring. For example, if a formal worker averaged a 10,000-peso salary per month, their retirement pension equaled 10,000 pesos monthly. Presently, however, with the implementation of the 1997 reforms, a worker who earns 10,000 pesos per month will only receive a $2,700-peso monthly pension. 

To fund this new pension scheme, AMLO’s administration has proposed the creation of a new public fund, the Fondo de Pensiones del Bienestar (Well-Being Pension Fund). The controversy is over where its money will come from. 

These pension funds will be paid from accounts that have remained untouched for at least three years — meaning no withdrawals or deposits — and that belong to retirees aged 70 and over. These funds are currently held by the Administradora de Fondos para el Retiro (Retirement Funds Administration), more commonly referred to as Afore, and total around 40 billion Mexican pesos, equivalent to US $2.3 billion.

According to Alcalde, 0.4% of these accounts have been untouched for more than 10 years. AMLO did note, however, that protections will be in place so that workers or dependents who later claim their retirement funds after they have been seized will still be able to access them.

The Well-Being Pension Fund will also be funded by money saved by the government from reductions to expenses, the sale of unused government real estate and the collection of debts. The approval of this reform requires a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers of Congress. 

The opposition in Mexico has argued that the direct transfer of money into a new fideicomiso (trust) without judicial approval violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

AMLO contends that the current pension system is a monopoly, with 10 or so banks serving as the primary administrators of the funds. AMLO went so far as to say that these financial corporations are so powerful that they control Mexican media and are leading smear campaigns against the implementation of the reform, equating it to theft. 

According to the president, these criticisms arise because the reform would harm the banks themselves, not the pension beneficiaries. The AMLO administration said that those opposing this reform and creating a “campaign of lies” against it are the same people who approved the “neoliberal reforms of Zedillo and Calderón.”

The reform was approved in committee on April 15, with 19 votes in favor and 10 votes against. The legislation was then sent to Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies for a vote two days later, when it was discovered that the legislation received differed substantially from the original legislation’s text.

For example, the legislation presented on April 17 stipulated that all individual accounts with Afore could be transferred to the new pension fund — not just those that have been inactive — a significant departure from the original legislation. The AMLO administration has significantly downplayed the error. 

It is undeniable that Mexico’s pension system needs updating, but the reform must strike a balance “between social responsibility and fiscal sustainability,” must account for restrictions in the Mexican economy and must promote a structure that “supports macro stability and financial market development in Mexico.” AMLO is rushing to complete a campaign promise of reforming the pension system without fully considering the long-term implications and challenges that this reform will pose.

According to national statistics agency INEGI, in 2020, there were nearly 10 million people aged 65 and older in Mexico, constituting 7.7% of the country’s population. This number is expected to more than double by 2050 to 16.5% — which presents a significant challenge in providing retirement pensions, especially given the proposed reform. 

AMLO’s priority seems to be on the short-term benefit: increasing the pension for the population of retirement age and thus securing their vote in the upcoming elections without adequately addressing the fact that this demographic will continue to grow substantially. The proposed reform is rushed, with some analysts arguing that it is a final push to ensure Morena’s victory come June.

But perhaps the real reason for the rush is to limit public discussion and scrutiny. Only a few weeks remain to determine the success of AMLO’s most recent effort at dismantling the neoliberal reforms of his predecessors and the consequences left in its wake.

Alexandra Helfgott works in the Office of Strategies at the Wilson Center, researching and writing about supply chains and energy. She also leads the Mexico Institute’s Elections Guide. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Alexandra was a Fulbright García-Robles grantee in Mexico.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

This article was originally published by the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center.

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As Mexico gears up for its largest-ever elections, Claudia Sheinbaum (Morena), the candidate currently leading the polls, has declared her intention to continue the main policies of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. This includes a vision of Mexican energy policy that considers the current government was stymied in achieving its energy sovereignty objectives due to an “inherited” legal framework — the energy reform of 2013. Recently, the president has proposed a constitutional reform that dismantles, in part, the legal framework of 2013, for which Sheinbaum has expressed absolute support. 

In this context, a review of Claudia Sheinbaum’s academic and policy background on energy issues can help us understand the possible future scenarios that could be at play in the energy sector if she wins the presidency in June. While these ideas may not necessarily materialize as public policy, they provide a scenario of how her perception of the sector has been shaped.

What would be similar to and different from the current administration? 

From her writings and speeches, it is clear that Sheinbaum shares with AMLO the idea of having strong state-productive companies to promote energy supply security; that a national energy policy should encourage a low rate of energy imports, particularly emphasizing less dependence on foreign natural gas and fuel imports; and that private participation in the energy sector should be allowed, but in second-order behind the state’s role.

On fossil fuels, Sheinbaum has in the past criticized multiple-service contracts at Pemex, the “obsession” with deep-water exploration at the expense of exploration and production in shallow waters and the need to involve foreign companies in these activities. When it comes to electricity, Sheinbaum publicly backed AMLO’s electricity reform initiative, particularly the idea of the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) becoming the main electricity generator in Mexico.

So where are the differences? Do they exist? 

One area where Sheinbaum seems to differentiate from AMLO’s views has to do with climate change and renewables. There, she has been a longtime advocate of the need for a broader diversification of Mexico’s energy matrix, with a specific focus on increasing the share of renewable energy sources, as well as a deeper commitment to the country’s climate change goals, where she has expressed the need for the country to be more ambitious. For example, during her tenure as Mexico City’s mayor, several of her government’s projects had a personal imprint toward these goals, although she never suggested discomfort with AMLO’s pro-fossil fuel policies in any way.   

Hence, if one would want to foresee how a Sheinbaum energy policy would look if she becomes the next president of Mexico, the conclusion would have to be overall continuity. with ideology continuing to shape many policy decisions — with some minor changes. 

However, despite any preconceived ideas about the energy sector that either Sheinbaum or her opposition rival Xóchitl Gálvez could have, the inherited challenges that the next administration will face are far more complex than the ones AMLO inherited in 2018. In a nutshell, Mexico faces increasing energy demand due to pent-up demand and nearshoring, coupled with insufficient investment in energy infrastructure, mainly for electricity transmission.

There is also a significant dependence on US natural gas; oil production that has fallen instead of increasing, as the administration promised; a deteriorating financial situation in Pemex; and widespread business distrust primarily caused by abrupt legislative and regulatory changes that halted investments and the function of market mechanisms, such as the oil rounds and electricity auctions.  

Therefore, in the end, no matter the ideological views any of the candidates have about energy, reality will play a critical force in shaping the route Mexico will follow in its always highly-politicized energy sector. 

This article was originally published by The Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center

Carlos Ramírez serves as the Practice Head of Financial Services and Energy. He previously held a position on Mexico’s Financial Stability Board from 2013 to 2018. During this period, he served as the Chairman of the National Commission of Retirement Savings System (CONSAR), overseeing the regulation of Mexico’s private pension system.

Mónica R. Díaz leads Integralia’s Energy Division, bringing with her extensive experience in Mexico’s energy sector and energy policies. She has a history of working in public institutions and currently provides advisory services to private companies on political and regulatory risks.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

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The country’s National Electoral Institute (INE) has continued to expand the ways that Mexican nationals can vote while abroad, hoping to both increase turnout and make Mexicans feel more connected to their country of origin despite living in the United States and, in the case of people without authorized immigration status, being unable to visit Mexico and subsequently return to their home in the U.S.

The discourse of the Morena government has done far more to recognize Mexican nationals abroad than previous governments. Both Morena’s founder, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), and its current presidential candidate, Sheinbaum, have praised emigrants for their contributions to Mexico’s economy in the form of remittances sent back home, while also celebrating that more and more migrants have been returning to Mexico in the past decade. 

This discourse is in line with Morena’s general emphasis on centering the most economically vulnerable. Mexicans who leave for the United States without authorized immigrant status tend to be those seeking to escape economic precarity, making them an important part of the population that Morena was founded on trying to reach.

While the recognition and praise of this demographic as “héroes paisanos” (compatriot heroes) is nice and might in and of itself help win consular votes, what concrete benefits can the Mexican government offer its emigrant constituents?

Expansion of consular services can go a long way without causing much political controversy. Mexican consulates already offer a much more expansive set of services than any other country with comparable numbers of immigrants in the United States —specifically when it comes to monitoring and supporting Mexican nationals in their interactions with U.S. law enforcement — but getting a passport or consular I.D. appointment can feel impossible. Not having a valid photo I.D. presents a wide array of impediments to basic mobility and access to services, and for many Mexican nationals without immigration status in the U.S., a passport or consular I.D. is their only option. 

Resources invested in expanding access to these appointments can provide a simple but necessary lifeline for unauthorized immigrants who do not have another way to acquire a valid photo I.D. Recently, however, AMLO has been pushing for far more ambitious and impactful plans. 

His government has cooperated extensively with the Biden administration on matters ranging from accepting people who have been removed from the United States and securing the Mexican-Guatemalan border. He is now seeking a broad package of benefits from the U.S. in exchange.

Among AMLO’s ideas are a US $20 billion Marshall Plan-style investment in Latin America, the removal of the U.S. embargo on Cuba and of sanctions against Venezuela, and — most consequentially for migrants — a mass immigration status regularization (amnesty) program for people from Latin America who have been living and working in the United States for 10 years or more.

As far-fetched as any form of amnesty seems in the current U.S. political environment, relief for unauthorized immigrants who meet certain requirements is an idea that has been present throughout the history of immigration policy. Traditionally, amnesty has been offered as a counterweight to increases in enforcement in other areas of immigration law, as was the case with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which granted a path to permanent residence and subsequently citizenship to almost 3 million qualifying immigrants. 

Since then, narrower forms of permanent or temporary legal forgiveness of unauthorized status have protected certain nationalities — or, in the case of DACA, people who were brought to the country as children — from deportation. These more recent protections have been the result of administrative adjustments and have not been codified by Congress. This means that they remain vulnerable to changes in administration or challenges in the courts.

In the years since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 and the placement of immigration enforcement within it, dramatically increasing border security and the detention of immigrants have far outpaced any new forms of relief. 

The result has been a bloated system that inflicts more punishment for lesser offenses at enormous human and economic costs, enriching security contractors and smugglers while cutting off opportunities for immigrants to build lives for themselves through formal channels.

It is long past time to counter this major pattern in immigration policy with new paths to authorized status, and the Morena government has every right to continue to use its leverage to press for amnesty wherever possible. Beyond the obvious humanitarian benefits to the recipients of regularized immigration status, amnesty has a host of benefits for both the U.S. and Mexico. 

Immigration from Mexico to the U.S. has been hovering around a net-zero rate for years. Many more Mexican nationals would be free to go back and forth if they knew that they were not jeopardizing their ability to reenter the United States by doing so, enabling them to contribute to their communities on both sides of the border. Authorized status would also allow Mexican nationals to legally work in the United States, which would increase both formal domestic production in the U.S. and potential remittances that boost the Mexican economy.

If they continue to push for this relief until some form of it is granted, AMLO and Sheinbaum will succeed in widely expanding not only their party’s voter base but also emigrants’ economic and cultural impact, as Mexican nationals in the United States are afforded the opportunity to formally contribute to the well-being of both nations.

This article was originally published by The Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center.

Ian Scholer received a Master’s Degree in Mexico-United States Studies from Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) with research focused on immigration detention. He currently works as a Paralegal at the Tennessee Immigrant & Refugee Rights Coalition.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

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Not far into its democratic transition, instances of lethal violence and forced disappearance, among other types of violence, began to increase dramatically in Mexico.

Despite being, by all accounts, an electoral democracy, for the last 17 years Mexico has been undergoing what various human rights monitoring international bodies have characterized as a crisis of human rights violations and impunity.

What happens when something that is meant to be exceptional — a crisis — becomes a regular part of the daily operations of public institutions and, more significantly, the everyday lives of the country’s most vulnerable citizens: children, teenagers, women, journalists, human rights defenders and even local politicians?

The causal explanations that have been put forward to address the disconcerting twin reality that Mexico is a democracy and a very violent society are varied. We can find some common ground in at least four of them.

The first is “the tip of the sword:” the intensification, starting with President Felipe Calderón’s 2006-2012 term, of the deployment of military forces and militarized federal and state law enforcement agencies to tackle crime-related issues.

Next is the  “uncommon response:” the fact that organized criminal actors fought back with “bullets and bribes.”

The third explanation is the opportunity factor —  the increase in the availability of illegal weapons flowing from the United States to Mexico due to relaxed gun control policies in the northern neighbor, providing more and deadlier tools to fight these fights.

Lastly, violence can also be partly explained by the paradox of local democratization itself in fragile contexts, where increasing democratic competition has tended to destabilize collusive arrangements between the state and organized crime, leading to large-scale criminal violence.

Against this backdrop, Mexico is entering the 2024 national election process. Here, I want to highlight two approaches in projects stemming from the work of Justicia Transicional en México (JTMX), the think-and-do tank on impunity issues in the country that I have led for the last two years. 

The first approach takes place on the micro, or local, level. By partnering with the Guernica Centre for International Justice to document and trace trajectories of violence in parts of a specific state in the country — Nayarit —  for a relatively protracted period (2011-2021) we have gained a degree of, albeit superficial, understanding on how violence unfolds and operates in local realities. 

Put briefly, in many realms of the country, violence establishes the real rules of the game and the resort to it coalesces private, public and illegal interests. The exercise of citizens’ rights is heavily restricted in these terrains. That should concern us. 

Second, at the macro or national level, a recent study by JTMX explores institutions established since 2013 to address aspects related to impunity in gross violations of human rights.

These include national systems like the National Search Commission (CNB), established in 2017, and Executive Commission for Attention to Victims (CEAV), founded in 2013, as well as presidential commissions addressing specific situations, like the 2018 Ayotzinapa truth commission and the 2021 commission on human rights violations committed from 1965 to 1990, during Mexico’s “dirty war.” It goes without saying that these institutions are merely the culmination of claims from victims and movements seeking improved institutional tools to address their demands for redress. 

However, despite partial solutions — and even with greater support from the federal government on some issues, such as addressing disappearances — their promise has begun to fade, as exemplified by a questionable strategy to reduce reported disappearance numbers.The intertwining of impunity with the country’s political system raises questions about the commitment of the three presidential candidates to address impunity: the elephant in the room. This year will be key. And time is pressing.

This article was originally published by The Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center

Jorge Peniche Baqueiro is a specialist in issues related to combating impunity and transitional justice. He previously served as the Executive Director of “JT MX. Justicia Transicional en México” (JT MX), a think and do tank that, since 2019, has been providing technical support to local and grassroots processes seeking truth and justice for gross human rights violations across Mexico.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

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In response to recent surges in violence, Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (FGR) and the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) undertook a joint effort to trace the origin and number of firearms in Mexico coming from or through the United States.

The data in this article highlights the growth in the bilateral arms trade, with particular emphasis on the years 2016-2022.

Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Ministry found that 70-90% of traced firearms originated from and passed through the United States. The ATF and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated a lower rate of 68%, comprising 50% domestically produced and 18% imported into the U.S., and ultimately found in Mexico.

The ATF data unveils compelling insights. Although pistols consistently topped the list of firearms found by the ATF, there was a 105% increase in rifles found in Mexico and reported from 2016 to 2022, meaning that cartels may be favoring this type of firearm. 

Specific U.S. counties have been linked to weapons found across Mexican municipalities, spanning from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts, as highlighted by former Foreign Affairs Minister Marcelo Ebrard and the FGR.

Concurrently, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has identified the presence of “ant-trafficking,” the intentional diversion of firearms from legal channels, and straw purchases, where individuals buy guns on behalf of others, along these routes.

These actions intensify the illegal transportation of firearms. The presence of guns in Mexico, as well as these two phenomena, demonstrate the connection of these trafficking routes, amplifying illegal firearm transportation.

The increase in these practices necessitates enhanced collaborative efforts between the United States and Mexico to curb the unlawful flow of firearms.

“Ant-trafficking” is identified by UNODC as a cross-border firearm trafficking phenomenon that involves discreet movement of small quantities, often targeting localized demands.

It is characterized by smaller batches and single straw purchases — a method where the intended buyer, either incapable of passing the mandatory federal background check or seeking to distance themselves from the transaction, employs another person who can successfully navigate the background check to acquire the firearm on their behalf.

Law enforcement data indicates that the majority of cross-border seizures involve fewer than five firearms, supporting the “ant-trafficking” pattern (UNODC, 2020; ATF, 2021).

Moreover, the U.S. grapples with the persistent issue of firearms trafficking across both its northern and southern borders. Illegal purchase of firearms within the U.S., often orchestrated by straw purchasing cells at the direction of cartels, fuels trafficking into Mexico (ATF, 2021).

These infographics feature data sourced from the ATF, verified by the GAO. Additional information is derived from the White House, Mexico’s Office of the Attorney General (FGR), and UNODC on cross-border firearm trafficking between 2016 and 2022.

This article was originally published by The Mexico Institute at The Wilson Center.

Guillermo Lemus graduated in 2023 with a Bachelor of Arts in International Studies from BYU-Idaho, with an emphasis in Public Policy and Administration, before pursuing an Internship in D.C. with Congressman Correa’s Office. Previously, he was a staff assistant intern in the Mexico Institute.

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You can read the first part of this series here.

AMLO’s Constitutional Reform Proposals

Andrew I. Rudman

Director, Mexico Institute

Many analysts have characterized the package of constitutional reforms presented by President López Obrador (AMLO) on Feb. 5 as a political maneuver intended to create wedge issues for the campaign and to further solidify AMLO’s Fourth Transformation by making it more difficult for a future president to reverse various measures and programs.  The maneuver may be good politics, but the proposed reforms are not good policy. Their passage would undermine transparency and weaken civil oversight of elected officials and will undermine confidence in the integrity of Mexican democracy.

One of the proposed reforms calls for the direct election of judges — a change from the current presidential appointment system. While this may sound democratic, and indeed judges are elected in some jurisdictions in the United States, AMLO’s reforms would politicize the third branch of government which is meant to act, in the words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts, “like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure everybody plays by the rules…” In the same testimony, he noted that, “judges are not politicians who can promise to do certain things in exchange for votes.”  The proposal to choose judges through popular vote is perhaps most concerning with respect to the Supreme Court in light of proposed reforms on the internal structure of the Court and AMLO’s direct and personal attacks on justices whose decisions went against his policies.

A second reform would eliminate several independent agencies designed to ensure transparency and protect Mexican consumers. Among those to be abolished are COFECE, Mexico’s Competition Commission, which is responsible for “protecting and promoting competition in the markets to contribute to the welfare of families and the economic growth of the country,” and the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Protection of Personal Information (INAI). COFECE is “responsible for the efficient functioning of markets to the benefit of consumers,” while INAI provides the transparency required to eliminate precisely the type of corruption that AMLO has sworn to eliminate. Nevertheless, AMLO calls these independent institutions “useless, factious, onerous and anti-popular” and argues that they should be eliminated so that the resources can be allocated to payment of pensions and other direct cash transfer programs. No institution is perfect, and it may indeed be appropriate to consider reforms to the functioning of COFECE, INAI, and some of the other identified institutions. However, their functions provide critical oversight of government, which is an essential part of a vibrant, functioning democracy.

Several of the other proposals are “feel good” proposals that are unlikely to lead to substantive, productive outcomes. A constitutional ban on the use of synthetic drugs not legally authorized, for example, is unlikely to have an impact on drug use which is already prohibited by law while the right to access to health is already included in Article 4 of the constitution.

Constitutional reforms based on thoughtful legislative debate with appropriate public consultation should (ideally) lead to broad based citizen support for them and to greater citizen confidence in the functioning of the institutions on which democracies are based. Reforms presented for wholly political objectives might win elections, but they leave the victors with poor policies with which to govern.

The Logic Behind AMLO’s Proposed Constitutional Changes

Pamela K. Starr

Wilson Center Global Fellow; Professor of the Practice of Political Science and International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences; Fellow, Center on Public Diplomacy and Professor, University of Southern California; Adjunct Fellow for Mexico and U.S.-Mexico Affairs, Pacific Council on International Policy

AMLO’s wish list of 20 constitutional and legal changes presented Feb. 5 runs from highly significant economic and political reforms to ultimately meaningless promises to respect animal rights and outlaw vaping. Two proposals stand out for their importance to economic stability, five for democratic practices, and one for both. All are designed to reinforce AMLO’s effort to transform Mexico into a more statist and less democratic country. Few, if any, have a significant chance of being approved in the current legislative session, but that’s not AMLO’s near term objective. He instead aims to guarantee that his vision for Mexico extends well beyond his single six-year presidency.

The Reforms: A pension reform is fiscally fraught. It would create a government guarantee that every worker receives 100% of their final salary, but it lacks a clear financing mechanism in a tight budgetary context coupled with a transexenial promise not to raise taxes. The proposal to enshrine AMLO’s electricity law in the constitution would permanently undermine investment in renewable energy and contravenes the USMCA. Regarding democracy, AMLO wants to strengthen military power and autonomy by giving it full control of the national guard, undermine the autonomy of the legal system by making all justices, judges and magistrates directly elected, reduce electoral competition by making all legislative elections first-past-the-post races, make all referenda binding if they are supported by just 30% of the electorate, and reduce the INE’s autonomy by making its board directly elected. Finally, AMLO proposes to eliminate autonomous agencies designed to promote economic competition and transparency.

The Objectives: AMLO aims to achieve three political effects from this announcement.  First, as these proposals gradually work their way through the legislative process over the next three months, the president’s agenda will dominate the news until the last month of the election campaign. This will help AMLO galvanize and mobilize his political base to get out the vote on June 2. Second, AMLO hopes to use the consequently strong turnout not only to ensure victory for his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, but to win the 68% of the vote needed to create a qualified majority in both houses of the federal legislature. This would allow him to push through all his proposed reforms in September, the last month of his presidency and the first month of the new Congress.

Failing that, the third effect would be to force Sheinbaum to embrace AMLO’s new governing agenda as central to her government. As a loyal obradorista whose election depends on AMLO’s continued backing, it is unsurprising that Sheinbaum immediately announced her support for the proposals. At the same time, there have been rumblings from her team, and from the candidate herself, that a Sheinbaum government might be more pragmatic and predictable as she implements AMLO’s Fourth Transformation. To ensure that this pragmatic bias does not lead Sheinbaum to stray too far from AMLO’s vision for Mexico, the proposal to reduce the percentage of the electorate needed to authorize referenda, including a presidential recall, from 40 percent to just 30 percent should keep her in line since AMLO’s loyal base of support reached the mid-30s. While AMLO will step down from the presidency on October 1, he still aims to extend his policy influence well beyond that date.

Mexico’s proposed constitutional reforms need careful scrutiny in Mexico and the U.S. 

Ambassador Earl Anthony Wayne

Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow, Former Career Ambassador to Afghanistan, Argentina, and Mexico; Distinguished Diplomat in Residence, School of International Service, American University

Mexico’s President López Obrador has proposed 20 constitutional and legal reforms in an apparent effort to boost his chosen successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, and his Morena party for Mexico’s June 2 national elections.

The proposals would protect and advance several AMLO favored initiatives by incorporating them in the constitution. Many of the suggested reforms would concentrate more power in Mexico’s executive at the expense of independent authorities working on electoral, economic, judicial, and other important issues. On Feb. 18, tens of thousands in Mexico met in protest citing several of the proposed reforms as threatening for Mexico’s democracy.

AMLO’s successor, Morena presidential candidate Sheinbaum, is 15-30% ahead in the polls, but AMLO wants his allies to win the 2/3 legislative majority that are needed to approve his recommended constitutional amendments. By offering these reform proposals now, AMLO seems aiming to remain in the limelight during the campaign season, allowing him to weigh in on issues that he sees a key to his legacy and appealing to his electorate.

While AMLO’s proposals can serve to limit the freedom of maneuver for Sheinbaum and other Morena party leaders, several proposals seem designed to put the opposition parties off balance by appealing to poorer Mexicans, for example, by suggesting generous but potentially costly new minimum salary and retirement benefits for workers.

Importantly, several proposals would reduce checks and balances built into Mexico’s democracy over the last 30 years. Concerning propositions include introducing elections for Mexico’s judges, eliminating independent bodies promoting transparency and access to information, weakening electoral authorities, and introducing changes that would favor larger over smaller political parties by eliminating the current use of proportional representation for some congressional seats.

The reforms would also bolster the military’s public security role by giving them formal authority over Mexico’s National Guard, without commensurate steps to strengthen civilian law enforcement or justice authorities. Experts warn against overreliance on the military for public security and other functions in Mexico.

From a good governance perspective, AMLO’s propositions would eliminate key autonomous regulatory bodies including those covering competition, telecommunications, and energy. These reforms would have direct and indirect impact on the implementation of the North American trade agreement, USMCA, and on U.S. companies doing business in Mexico.

Overall, if approved, the proposals would weaken key Mexican institutions. They would give the government more concentrated power by expanding its ability to regulate with less oversight through eliminating independent authorities. This would be a shift away from best international practices and harm Mexico’s ability to attract investment.

With a proposal to cap salaries of public officials even for very demanding regulatory, oversight and judicial jobs (and incorporating AMLO’s version of “austerity” into Mexico’s constitution), the proposed changes could well further weaken Mexico’s public service, which has already been diminished in recent years.

AMLO’s proposals would also protect several AMLO initiatives. These include social welfare programs for the disadvantaged and programs aimed at job training for young people and planting more trees. However, at least the job training program has been criticized for poor results and there is not yet attention to evaluating the effectiveness of the programs that would be protected.

Mexico’s executive has yet made clear the additional fiscal costs that would be imposed on future governments by AMLO’s proposals. Experts say those costs could be substantial and require a serious discussion to consider future costs.

One potentially important AMLO proposal is to put his ban on hydraulic fracking into the constitution. This would tie the hands of future governments who might find more ecologically acceptable ways to develop Mexico’s significant natural gas resources to meet energy security needs. Mexico is very reliant on natural gas from the U.S., for example.

From a U.S. perspective, some proposals threaten commitments made in the USMCA trade agreement and could harm U.S. businesses in Mexico. Mexico is the U.S.’s largest trading partner and depends heavily on exports to the U.S. and U.S. investments for jobs and growth.

AMLO’s proposed reforms would weaken and eliminate independent regulators that are intended to play a vital role in the energy, telecommunications, competition, and transparency areas, as well as in countering corruption. The U.S. has already complained that Mexico not following the USMCA’s regulatory and transparency procedures in the agricultural and energy sectors. AMLO’s current proposals would also transform Mexico’s oil and electricity entities into fully state-owned and run entities, which could allow for further questionable practices and policies.

In general, independent bodies are considered very valuable for good regulatory policy making and for transparency. These types of regulatory entities are important for good implementation of the USMCA and for protection of the many US companies operating in Mexico. Mexico already ranks poorly in studies of regulatory enforcement, and Mexico has been cited recently for a lack of transparency and increased use of no-bid contracts for government-related projects. Observers also express concern that the proposed judicial reforms will reduce the independence and professionalization of judges in reviewing economic, regulatory and legal complaints.

In an apparent effort to circumvent USMCA, AMLO also proposes to put a ban on genetically modified corn into the constitution. U.S. farmers currently sell massive quantities of GM corn to Mexico, and the U.S. has filed a USMCA trade complaint about Mexico’s plans to ban GM corn without providing science-based evidence. A GMO ban would seriously harm many US farmers and underscore important differences over the use of science-based policies as required in USMCA.

Strategically, the U.S. seeks a strong democratic Mexico to be a good partner in building a more competitive, prosperous North America. Several of AMLO’s proposed constitutional and legal changes, however, should spark serious concern in Washington.

AMLO’s proposals certainly deserve thorough debate and examination in Mexico.  Additionally, they should attract scrutiny and appropriate responses from the U.S.  If enacted, several could have a major impact on U.S.-Mexico relations.

This article was originally published by The Mexico Institute at The Wilson Center.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

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Constitutional Changes

Ambassador Roberta Lajous

Wilson Center Fellow; Researcher, El Colegio de México; former Mexican Ambassador to Austria, Bolivia, Cuba and Spain

From the National Palace, not Congress, President López Obrador (AMLO) announced on Feb. 5 a potpourri of 18 sweeping constitutional reforms that severely downgrade Mexican democracy. If the reforms go ahead, the Supreme Court would be debilitated by having its members openly elected, independent regulatory agencies would disappear, the electoral authority would be back under the control of the president and the ongoing militarization of the police force would be formalized. At the same time, with a clear authoritarian streak, and going against all international standards and recommendations, the instances where individuals could go to prison before being judged are broadened to include even the incorrect filing of taxes. To sweeten the deal, accompanying laws propose pie in the sky pensions, which would be raised by as much as 100% of workers’ final salaries, threatening financial disaster for the treasury. These proposed changes lack the needed majority to be approved by this Congress. Therefore, they will become the electoral platform for AMLO’s handpicked successor, Claudia Sheinbaum. Once again, the president has been successful in setting the agenda for public debate but, this time, at the cost of leaving no oxygen for Sheinbaum to voice her own views.

Since there is no possibility of presidential reelection in Mexico, AMLO is seeking to prolong his power well beyond his six-year term. Sheinbaum, if elected, will have to remain under AMLO’s control and be subjected to the threat of a recently approved poll that could revoke her mandate within two years of taking office. Given the influence AMLO holds over a significant part of the electorate through his daily press conference, it will be a real challenge for the opposition candidate, Xóchitl Gálvez, to make the case against these proposed reforms. However, if anyone can successfully do it, it is her. Xóchitl is a charismatic leader who comes from poverty and discrimination but propelled herself through higher education to become a successful businesswoman and, later, a democratic politician.

Mexicans need a new government respectful of checks and balances — not this new constitution that would throw Mexico back to its authoritarian past. The last chance to rectify the course taken by AMLO will be the June 2 election, the biggest Mexico has ever had, where the two full houses of Congress will be elected along with many state legislators, governors and mayors. The unified opposition platform of the three main parties — PAN, PRI and PRD — along with civil society organizations, will present an alternative project. Hopefully they will show the muscle needed for the campaign, which officially starts March 1. Provided they remain united, this coalition could stop the militarization of society and the return to an unrestrained presidential system.

AMLO’s Last-Minute Mini-Sexenio

Alejandro García Magos

Lecturer, University of Toronto

The vertigo of losing power has finally caught up with AMLO. On Feb. 5, a seven-month “mini-sexenio” commenced, during which, at the eleventh hour, AMLO will attempt to fulfill his promise of laying the groundwork for a “transformation” and securing a place in history.

Despite five years and two months having passed without achieving his promised objectives — namely, the reduction of criminal violence and the acceleration of economic growth — it is only now, mere months before relinquishing power, that 20 constitutional reforms are being proposed to finally steer the country towards peace and prosperity.

AMLO is not the first president to try to salvage his legacy at the last minute. José López Portillo tried it in 1982 when, three months before stepping down, he decreed the nationalization of the banking sector, leaving a political and economic mess for his successor, Miguel de la Madrid. Similarly, AMLO is proposing an agenda for the next government and a change of political regime for Mexico, which is, for the time being, still democratic. Indeed, his proposals seek to dismantle the independence of the judiciary, eliminate the autonomy of electoral authorities and militarize public security. AMLO has launched these proposals (that have already foundered in Congress) like a Hail Mary pass into the end zone. It would be amusing if not for the fact that the future of the country is at stake.

This package of reforms is an implicit acknowledgment of the shortcomings of AMLO’s government and the fact that time and political capital have run out. This seven-month mini–sexenio can be seen as the tale of a president who missed his chance and now, in the twilight of his administration, seeks to leave a symbolic mark. In the absence of tangible results, laws are being proposed. Regardless of the outcome of these reforms, the quality of life for Mexicans is unlikely to change. Despite the high expectations raised by AMLO six years ago at the beginning of his government, his actual political record is underwhelming. As for the mini–sexenio, what more can be said, except that perhaps the saying about history repeating itself twice, first as tragedy and then as farce, holds true.

The Politics of AMLO’s Reform Proposals

Luis Rubio

Mexico Institute Advisory Board Member; president of México Evalúa-CIDAC and former president of the Mexican Council on International Affairs (COMEXI). He is a prolific columnist on international relations and on politics and the economy, writing weekly for Reforma newspaper, and regularly for The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and The Financial Times.

There are at least three factors that led President López Obrador to send Congress a package of extremely ambitious (and deleterious) constitutional amendments. The first and most obvious one is that this puts him in a position where he can advocate for a vision of the future without violating the letter of the electoral law, even though he’s doing it precisely to circumvent it. The second reason is to provoke an opposition outcry to consolidate his base. The third, and most puzzling, is to control his candidate. While the first two can be summarized as “politics as usual,” the third is the most transcendent, for it underscores the complexity of the coming race.

The context of the president’s thrust is very clear: He has spent the last five years fully devoted to the succession process now underway. Rather than push an ambitious development project, like all his predecessors did (regardless of the project’s respective merit or soundness), President López Obrador is unique in that he is concentrated on two things and two things only: eliminating or neutralizing all or most institutional checks on presidential power in an attempt to recreate the all-powerful presidency of yesteryear. And, building and securing an electoral base to win the 2024 election.

AMLO measures his success or failure by the result of the June 2 election. Now that the election looms, the question is whether he can accomplish his only objective. And the constitutional reforms are an important element in this regard.

The president has by now created a complex relationship with his anointed candidate, Claudia Sheinbaum. For AMLO to reach his goal, she must win the election; however, were she to win, she would have to alter course. The roadmap designed by AMLO will not allow her to be successful as it would only deepen the polarization in which the president thrives. AMLO cannot be repeated; nobody can duplicate his history or skills, thus making it impossible for his successor to replicate his tactics, starting with the permanent attempt to polarize and sow discord.

Sheinbaum has embraced the president’s proposed reforms, for she cannot say otherwise if she wants to win. Yet, by embracing them, she loses the support of many Mexicans who would rather seek a more harmonious government. Thus, the president’s reforms evidence the divergent interests between AMLO and his candidate, which might well create the conditions for a truly competitive presidential race.

The content of the proposed reforms is now the subject of serious analysis and debate, as they would upend not only the attempt to build a democracy over the last several decades, but also a market-based economy embodied in NAFTA/USMCA. Beyond the specifics of the proposed reforms, the politics behind them are clear: The president wants to win the coming election and will stop at nothing to guarantee that result.

This article was originally published by The Mexico Institute at The Wilson Center. A part two will follow here on Mexico News Daily.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Mexico News Daily, its owner or its employees.

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